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Employer:  ABC Professional Tree Services  )    State File No.  57318-2014 
  ) 
Employee:  Luciano Gonzales   )    Docket No.  2014-06-0015 
  ) 
  ) 
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Affirmed and Remanded – Filed November 10, 2014 
 
ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING AND REMANDING  
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
CLAIMS 
This interlocutory appeal involves a tree-trimmer who suffered a broken leg as a result of 
falling from a tree when he accidently severed a lanyard affixed to his safety belt and 
harness.  The employer denied the claim, asserting the employee’s injury was due to the 
employee’s willful misconduct and/or willful failure or refusal to use a safety device 
when he failed to tie-in to a climbing rope before engaging in cutting.  The court of 
workers’ compensation claims found that the employee chose to disregard the tie-in 
policy, resulting in the accident and injury, and that the employer successfully asserted 
the defense of willful misconduct.  The employee appealed.  Having carefully reviewed 
the record, we affirm the decision of the court of workers’ compensation claims. 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge 
Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner, joined. 
Landon Lackey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Luciano Gonzales 
Nicole M. Grida, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, ABC Professional 
Tree Services 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
Luciano Gonzales (“Employee”) is a 27-year old resident of Oak Grove, 
Kentucky.  At the time of his July 1, 2014 injury, Employee had been employed by ABC 
Professional Tree Services (“Employer”) for almost two years as a tree-climber/trimmer.        
  
On August 26, 2014, Employee filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (“PBD”) 
seeking temporary disability benefits and medical benefits.  Employee alleged in his PBD 
that he was injured July 1, 2014, when he fell while trimming a tree within the course of 
his employment.  On July 30, 2014, Employer filed a Notice of Denial of Claim wherein 
Employer asserted Employee’s claim “is being denied as evidence supports willful 
misconduct as claimant violated safety procedures and intentionally caused . . . harm to 
himself.” 
 
 Following an unsuccessful mediation, a Dispute Certification Notice (“DCN”) was 
issued September 29, 2014, by a workers’ compensation mediator.  The DCN identified 
the disputed issues to include medical benefits, temporary disability benefits and 
compensability.  Defenses identified in the DCN were limited to “willful misconduct / 
willful failure or refusal to use safety device.” Employee filed a request for expedited 
hearing September 29, 2014, and the trial judge exercised his discretion to conduct a full 
evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues as authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-239(d) (2014).1 
 
The hearing was conducted telephonically on October 18, 2014.  There were 
technical challenges due to the hearing being conducted telephonically, and we note that 
no objection was raised to the witnesses testifying by telephone or to the telephonic 
hearing. 
 
Three witnesses testified.  Employee’s witnesses included himself and a former 
co-worker, Anthony Kelly.   Employer’s Safety Director, Rick Bentley, testified on 
behalf of Employer.  Employee acknowledged in his testimony that he received training 
as to the safety rules required for his position as a tree-trimmer.  Employer’s “Climber 
Trimmer Proficiency Guidelines” were introduced into evidence, which Employee 
admitted reviewing and initialing.  He also admitted successfully completing the 
                                                 
1
 The trial judge has the authority to “issue an interlocutory order either awarding or denying temporary 
disability or medical benefits based on a review of the documents submitted and without convening a 
formal hearing.”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(13) (2014).  See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
239(d)(2) (2014).  However, the trial judge also has the “discretion to convene a hearing of a motion for 
temporary disability or medical benefits if the judge determines that convening a hearing is necessary to 
determine the issues presented.”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(13) (2014).  In this case, the 
trial judge chose the latter option and held a hearing.    
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“Climber Trimmer Qualification Exam” in March and April of 2013, which was also 
introduced as an exhibit. 
 
 Employee testified that on the date of injury, he was supervised by a foreman 
named “Luis,”2 who Employee testified had worked as a supervisor for about two weeks. 
According to Employee, Luis spoke Spanish and could not speak English, and neither 
Employee nor anyone else in the crew could speak Spanish.  Employee testified, “I know 
a little bit of Spanish.  I don’t know enough.  But I understand a couple of words.”  
 
Employee explained that on the day of the accident, the tree that the crew was 
assigned to trim could have been trimmed using a hydraulic lift bucket, but the hydraulic 
was not working, “so they had me go and climb it.”  Employee described the events 
leading to the accident as follows: 
 
As I was going up to trim it, I was going to go all the way up and tie-in.  He 
[Luis] was rushing me, telling me to, in Spanish, “Ándale, ándale, corte 
rápido,” which means cut really fast. Cut it, like, as I was going up. So I 
just -- I did what he said, and I was trimming the tree as I was going up, and 
that’s when I had the accident.  I trimmed the limb and -- and then I fell out 
of the tree. 
 
And so pretty much I was just doing what I was told, you know.  If he 
would not have rushed me, I could have climbed -- I could have tied -- went 
all the way to the top, tied-in and then kind of trimmed coming down, you 
know.  But he had me trim as I was just -- I just had my safety hangers on.  
I wasn’t fully tied-in because I was listening to what he said.  I was going 
to -- I was spiking it up and I had my lanyard on, and as I was going up, he 
said . . . . 
 
BY MR. LACKEY: 
Q. Mr. Gonzales? 
 (Technical interruption.) 
. . . . 
THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I had my lanyard on, and I was -- I was climbing 
up it and I was climbing -- as I was climbing up to tie-in to go all the way 
up -- first you got to tie-in.  That’s what I was going to do.  That was my 
first step as I was -- as I was using pole -- pole spikes, the company-issued 
pole spikes. . . .  I was climbing up it with my lanyards.  And as I was going 
up, the foreman was rushing me to, in Spanish, “Ándale, ándale.  Rápido 
corte,” you know, telling me to cut it really fast.  And that’s when I had the 
                                                 
2
 Employee testified he believed the supervisor/foreman’s surname is Ramirez.  Employer’s Position Statement 
identifies him as Luis Miranda. Employer’s witness, Rick Bentley, said he did not know the supervisor/foreman’s 
surname, but believed it to be Ramirez. 
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accident.  I never -- if I’d never been rushed I would never had the accident.  
I always climb a tree safely.  You know, I know the rules.  And the man 
was rushing me, and I was just doing what he was -- said.  You know, 
taking his judgment on seeing the tree as I was going up, something I’ve 
never done.  And I always tie-in, because I know -- you know, I’m scared 
of falling.  I’m not going to hurt myself.  But I was just listening to what 
my foreman said. 
 
 On cross-examination, Employee explained that he knew little Spanish and  
asserted that his supervisor never gave him the chance to go up and tie-in:  
 
Q.  You know limited Spanish, or are you fluent in Spanish? 
A.  I know -- I know very little Spanish.  I know -- 
Q.  Okay. 
A.  -- a few words. 
Q.  Okay.  And with regard to the few words that you heard your supervisor 
or your foreman say to you, it was to the extent of saying, “Get up,” or “Get 
up the tree” or “Hurry up”; is that accurate? 
A.  “Ándale,” which means hurry up. 
Q.  Uh-huh. 
A.  “Rápido” means faster. 
Q.  Uh-huh. 
A.  And “corte,” that means cut. 
Q.  Okay.  So “Hurry up, cut” and “fast”? 
A.  Yeah. 
Q.  At no point did you ever hear him say:  Do not use your -- do not tie-in, 
did you? 
A.  No.  He -- 
Q.  Okay.  So he never -- he told you to hurry up.  He never told you not to 
tie-in; he never told you not to go to the top of the tree, did he? 
A. Well, as I was going up, he was screaming at me, hollering at me to 
hurry up, so that’s what I was listening to, what he was saying.  And he was 
telling me to cut.  What I -- what -- where I started trimming at, I hadn’t 
been tied-in yet.  He was telling me to cut as I was going up, but he never 
gave me the chance to really go up and tie-in before rushing me. 
. . . . 
Q.  Okay.  But one thing you do know is that you, in your two years of 
working there, you know that you’re supposed to go to the top and tie-in, 
don’t you? 
A.  Yes, I know to go in and tie-in, but I was just listening to what my 
foreman was saying at the time. 
Q.  And you know to go and tie-in because you were taught to go and tie-
in; isn’t that correct? 
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A.  Well, there’s different ways of climbing a tree.  You can use a bell ball 
(phonetic), which the company, they never use that.  You can -- you can 
spike up it. 
Q.  Uh-huh. 
A.  But I seen them guys do it plenty of times the way this -- kind of 
spiking up it.  But yes, you’re correct. 
Q.  Well, is it your testimony or not that you knew that you were supposed 
to tie-in? 
A.  Yes, I knew that I was -- 
Q.  Okay.  And you knew that you were supposed to tie-in because you 
were trained to tie-in; isn’t that correct? 
A.  Correct. 
. . . . 
Q.  Okay.  So you’re testifying today under oath that you were in fact 
properly tied-in and your lanyard was sufficient for tie -- being tied-in per 
company policy, is that your testimony? 
A.  Correct. 
Q.  Okay 
A.  I was tied-in to the tree with my lanyard.   
Q. Okay.  So when it comes to being tied-in, you -- you understand that a 
lanyard is not sufficient to be tied-in? 
A.  No, a lanyard is sufficient. 
. . . . 
Q.  What were you -- oh.  You said you were cutting on your way up.  How 
were you cutting? 
A.  Well, there’s some limbs in -- you know, in the way as I was going up 
before I can totally tie-in.  But the foreman was asking me to trim those 
limbs before I went all the way up. 
         
 Employee was asked whether he was “aware of the zero-tolerance, that in the 
event that you’re not properly tied-in, that you would in fact be terminated.”  Employee 
responded, “I’m saying no, I was not aware of that.”  Employee was asked if the foreman 
had not rushed him, “is it your testimony that you would still have cut that tree in the 
same manner?”  Employee responded: 
 
A. If he wouldn’t have rushed me, I could have did things differently. 
Q.  Uh huh.  And the things you would have been diff- -- done differently, 
is you would have tied-in with a climbing rope, wouldn’t you have? 
A.  Yes. 
 
On re-direct, Employee was asked about Employer’s Guidelines and how often 
after Employee completed his exam that the Guidelines were brought up.  Employee 
responded, “not often.”  
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Following questioning by counsel, the trial judge questioned Employee: 
 
 THE COURT:  All right.  And when you say you’re  -- you have a 
lanyard on, that’s a little mysterious to me.  Are you indicating to me that -- 
that the lanyard is wrapped around the tree, and that as you climb with the 
spikes, you move that up, and that’s the way you’re tied-in to the tree; is -- 
am I understanding that correctly? 
 THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  Okay.  And what is -- what is the -- when you 
referred to a climbing rope, what does that mean? 
 THE WITNESS:  A climbing rope is a -- is a rope that goes on your 
harness, and it -- usually you use it when you’re coming down the tree.  
When you’re climbing up the tree, you don’t use it, but once you’re -- I 
mean, you can use it going up a tree, because you can use a throw ball.  
Well I’m not good with a throw ball, so I was trained to use the -- the pole 
spikes.  I mean, not the pole -- yeah, the pole spikes and the -- the -- and the 
lanyard.  But you can also -- you can use a throw ball and you can throw it 
in the crotch of the tree and the throw ball will come down and you put 
your -- the rope in it and you could tie-in with that as if -- well, I was never 
trained to use a throw ball. 
 THE COURT:  Okay.  So the normal course of events is to use -- 
using your lanyard and pole spikes to climb -- 
 THE WITNES:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  -- to the top of the tree and then tie off once you get 
up there to the climbing rope; is that -- do I understand that correctly? 
 THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  You can use your -- you take your 
climbing rope with you. 
 THE COURT:  Okay. 
 THE WITNESS:  And then once you get up there, you find a crotch 
and then you tie-in and then, you know, start doing your trimming.   
 THE COURT:  All right.  Now, it’s still not clear to me how or why 
you fell.  I -- I -- did you just slip and fall?  Did -- I mean, how -- why did 
you fall? 
 THE WITNESS:  I was cutting a limb and I cut -- I guess I cut 
through the lanyard, and I fell.  That’s all I know.  Because I kind of -- 
 THE COURT:  All right.  So at -- 
. . . . 
 THE COURT:  -- at the time you were cutting the limb -- I’m trying 
to understand this.  At the time you were cutting the limb, was the lanyard 
wrapped around the tree and hooked onto your harness? 
 THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir. 
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 THE COURT:  So if you had not cut that, you would not have fallen; 
am I understanding that correctly? 
 THE WITNESS:  Correct. 
 
 Employee testified the foreman’s role is to plan and lead how a job will be 
completed with safety in mind, and that it is important to listen to the foreman, or “the 
company will discipline you.” Employee stated, “I did what he said and I had an 
accident.”  Employee was terminated three days after the accident for his failure to follow 
safety rules.  
 
Employee’s only other witness was a former co-worker, Anthony Kelly.  Kelly is 
a certified truck driver and not a tree-trimmer.  He testified he was one of three workers 
present on the day of the accident.  He recalled the foreman, Luis, whom he said cannot 
speak English, saying, “ándale, ándale,” to Employee prior to the fall.  He testified that he 
presumed Employee “had slipped and fell because he was trying to go up the tree as fast 
as he could.”  When asked whether he recalled the foreman saying anything else to 
Employee, he responded, “well, like I said he was speaking in Spanish, you know, 
‘ándale, ándale, quatros [sic], quatros [sic].’  I don’t know what ‘quatros [sic]’ means.”  
Kelly testified that “the foreman’s role is to give us safety information before we start a 
job, which he can’t do because he can’t speak English.”  He testified that employees 
would be disciplined if they did not listen to the foreman. 
 
On cross-examination, Kelly admitted that he had been terminated for reasons 
unrelated to Employee’s accident. Contrary to his testimony on direct examination, he 
testified that he actually saw Employee’s fall:  “my testimony is that he was trying to get 
up -- get up around the tree and in a fashion where Mr. Luis was telling him to.”  When 
asked what caused Employee to fall, he responded, “by [Employee] trying to move faster 
than he could.”  
 
Employer’s only witness was Rick Bentley, Employer’s Safety Director.  He 
testified he is responsible for safety and training for the entire company.  He said 
employees are trained in stages, and at the end of every stage they are tested and must be 
“proficient” to move on to the next stage.  He testified training to be a climber lasts 
anywhere from sixty (60) days to six (6) months, followed by a written exam.  He 
testified Employee was a “Climber/Trimmer Trainee.” 
 
Bentley testified that OSHA regulations require tying-in any time a trimmer is 
higher than four feet off the ground.  He testified Employer “has a lifesaving rule that we 
require our people to be tied-in from the time they leave the ground until the time they 
return back to the ground safely.”  He explained “tied-in” as follows: “tied-in means that 
you are tied-in with a climbing rope or safety straps, and before any work is performed, 
you have to be -- it’s mandatory that you’re tied-in with a climbing line or a lifeline.”  
When asked what type of safety mechanisms or lines Employee should have used in 
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trimming limbs, Bentley responded:  “[w]ell, he should have had a climbing line.  And if 
he’s cutting in close proximity, as he described, at waist level to that climbing line, he 
should have also had a safety strap in addition to the climbing line.”  
 
 Bentley opined that Employee’s use of the safety lanyard without tying-in to a 
climbing rope was insufficient “because it is a secondary safety measure.”  He explained 
that even when the safety lanyard is used properly, the body can go limp and the trimmer 
can still fall.  He testified that before trimming, it is mandatory to tie-in with a climbing 
line or “life line,” and he emphasized that Employee’s safety strap would have been the 
secondary tie-in.3 
 
Bentley’s direct examination included the following: 
 
Q. Have you had instances where employees have ascended or cut 
limbs and only used a safety lanyard? 
A. In any situation we’ve had in the past where anybody violated a 
life-saving rule that employee is terminated. 
Q. And you have in fact in the past terminated people for violating 
this safety rule? 
A. Yes, for violating life-saving rules, that’s correct. 
 
  Bentley testified “there is no exception to the tie-in rule and employees will be 
terminated if the life-saving rule is violated.”  He said “nothing trumps Employer’s safety 
rules.”  Bentley testified that all employees are trained in the “ABCs of Life,”4 which 
explain the discipline policy regarding safety rule violations.  He testified that Employees 
must be able to recite the “ABCs of Life” before they are allowed to work in the field.  
 
On cross-examination Bentley testified that he works from the home office in 
Texas, but that much of his time is spent inspecting crews all over the country.  He was 
neither present when Employee’s accident occurred, nor could he recall if he ever met 
Employee.  He said Employee made a choice not to tie-in first.  He said all employees are 
given “stop-work” authority whenever they feel someone’s safety is in jeopardy, and that 
employees “quite frequently” invoke the “stop-work” authority.  When asked how long it 
takes to tie-in, Bentley testified that “once you’re in a position in a tree as [Employee] 
was, it’s a matter of putting a rope around a tree, snapping it on the -- a snap and tying 
one knot, so I would say 30 seconds.” 
 
Following the hearing, the trial judge filed an interlocutory order on October 16, 
2014, finding that Employee clearly had knowledge of the 100% tie-in policy as 
evidenced by his training and test scores; that Employee’s own testimony evidenced a 
                                                 
3
 Employer’s Safety Director and its counsel referred to the rule at issue interchangeably as a “tie-in” rule or policy 
and as the “100% tie-in” rule or policy.  
4
 This document was not introduced into evidence. 
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clear understanding of the danger involved in violating the rule; and that the 
uncontroverted proof of Employer that the rule was strictly enforced on a regular basis 
established “bona fide” enforcement.  Lastly, the trial judge concluded that Employee 
lacked a valid excuse for violating the rule. Finding that the Employer successfully raised 
the willful misconduct affirmative defense, the trial judge determined he need not reach 
the issues of temporary disability benefits and medical benefits and denied Employee’s 
interlocutory request.  
 
Employee filed a timely request for an appeal on October 22, 2014.  A transcript 
of the proceedings was prepared from an audio recording by a certified court reporter.   
On October 31, 2014, the record was received and docketed by the Clerk of the Appeals 
Board.  For the reasons explained below, the trial judge’s decision is affirmed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review to be applied by this Board in reviewing a trial judge’s 
decision is statutorily mandated and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a 
presumption that the findings and conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are 
correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-
6-239(c)(7) (2014).  The trial judge’s decision must be upheld unless “the rights of the 
party seeking review have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions of a workers' compensation judge: 
 
 (A)  Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
 (B)  Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation judge; 
 (C)  Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
 (D)  Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or                   
        clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
 (E)  Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the      
                   light of the entire record.  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2) (2014).   
 
In applying the above standards, courts have construed substantial and material 
evidence to mean “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under 
consideration.”  Clay County Manor, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759 
(Tenn. 1993)( quoting Southern Railway Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 
196, 199 (Tenn. 1984)).  Like other courts applying the standard embodied in section 50-
6-217(a)(2), the Board will not disturb the decision of the trial judge absent the limited 
circumstances identified in the statute.   
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Analysis 
     
Although the Workers’ Compensation Act creates a system in which employees 
can recover benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault, see Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-103(a) (2014), there are circumstances in which an employee 
cannot recover for injuries that would otherwise be compensable due to the employee’s 
conduct.  In this instance, Employer contends that Employee cannot recover benefits 
because Employee engaged in willful misconduct and willfully failed or refused to use a 
safety device. 
 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a) (2014) provides in subsections (1) 
and (4) that no compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the 
employee’s “willful misconduct” or the employee’s “willful failure or refusal to use a 
safety device.”  These provisions condition the preclusion of compensation in 
circumstances where the alleged injury was “due to” the willful misconduct or the willful 
failure or refusal to use a safety device.  In this context, “due to” means the proximate 
cause of the injury or death and not merely a remote or contributing cause.  See Mitchell 
v. Fayetteville Pub. Utils., 368 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Tenn. 2012)(citing Coleman v. Coker, 
204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1952) and Overall v. S. Subaru Star, Inc., 
545 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1976)(when a statute uses the language “due to,” this refers to 
proximate cause)).     
 
  If an employer defends on the grounds that the injury arose from willful 
misconduct or from the willful failure or refusal to use a safety device, the burden of 
proof is on the employer to establish the defense.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-110(b) 
(2014).      Thus, the “burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that the willful 
misconduct or the willful failure to use a safety appliance was the proximate cause of the 
injuries.”5  Mitchell, 368 S.W.3d at 448-449.  Prior to the Mitchell case, the analyses of 
an employer’s willful misconduct defense and an employer’s defense of willful failure or 
refusal to use a safety device differed.  There was a three-pronged test first announced in 
Insurance Co. of America v. Hogsett, 486 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tenn. 1972), to assess an 
employer’s defense of willful misconduct under the statute as it then existed.6   In Nance 
v. State Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel 2000),  the 
Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel fashioned a test for the more specific 
statutory defense of willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance, which required the 
                                                 
5
 Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a) was amended in 2009 to, among other changes, substitute “safety 
device” for “safety appliance.”  The provisions of section 110(a) were not altered by the amendments to the 
Workers’ Compensation Act that became effective July 1, 2014. 
6
 The Court stated as follows: “we are of the opinion the employer has shown the three elements, as deduced from 
the opinions of this Court, constituting willful misconduct as contemplated by the statute and they are: (1) an 
intention to do the act, (2) purposeful violation of orders, and (3) an element of perverseness.” Hogsett, 486 S.W.2d 
at 733.  
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employer to establish four elements in order to successfully defeat compensability.7  In 
Mitchell, the Supreme Court commented that the Nance holding “illustrates a close 
relationship between willful misconduct and willful failure or refusal to use a safety 
appliance.”  Mitchell, 368 S.W.3d at 452.  Noting that Larson’s Workers’ Compensation 
Law (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.) [hereinafter Larson’s] also recognizes “the blurred line 
between the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and the willful failure or refusal to 
follow a safety regulation or policy,” the Court quoted Larson’s conclusion that if the 
willful misconduct defense amounts to no more than a violation-of-safety-regulation 
defense, “it would be much better to say so in plain language and put an end to the 
litigation inspired by the vague breadth of the phrase ‘wil[l]ful misconduct.’” Id. (quoting 
Larson’s § 34.02).  
 
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court noted Larson’s suggestion that the elements 
required to assert successful defenses for willful misconduct, willful disobedience of 
safety rules, and willful failure to use a safety device should be determined by the same 
standard, and the Court adopted a single standard “for this and future cases involving 
these statutory defenses.”  Id. at 452-53.  Thus, to meet its statutory burden of proof to 
establish the defense of willful misconduct or willful failure or refusal to use a safety 
device, an employer must prove the following four elements: 
 
(1)  the employee’s actual, as opposed to constructive, notice of the rule; 
(2)  the employee’s understanding of the danger involved in violating the rule; 
(3)  the employer’s bona fide enforcement of the rule; and 
(4)  the employee’s lack of a valid excuse for violating the rule. 
 
Mitchell, 368 S.W.3d at 453. 
 
In the instant case, Employer asserts that it satisfied its burden in proving each of 
the four elements to deny Employee’s claim.  The trial judge found that Employer met its 
burden to prove each element, and we agree. 
 
1.  Employee’s Actual, as Opposed to Constructive, Notice of the Rule 
  
Employer asserts there is a “100% tie-in” rule that Employee willfully chose to 
ignore.  Employee was questioned about an examination he took at the completion of his 
training with Employer in 2013 and about one of the true-false questions on the exam. 
Employee acknowledged it is “true” that Employer has a 100% tie-in policy, but 
                                                 
7
 The Panel identified these four elements the employer must establish to avoid payment under the statute: (1) at the 
time of the injury the employer had in effect a policy requiring the employee’s use of a particular safety appliance; 
(2) the employer carried out strict, continuous and bona fide enforcement of the policy; (3) the employee had actual 
knowledge of the policy, including a knowledge of the danger involved in its violation, through training provided by 
the employer; and (4) the employee willfully and intentionally failed or refused to follow established policy 
requiring use of the safety appliance.  Nance, 33 S.W.3d at 226. 
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Employee never was asked what the 100% tie-in policy is or what constituted 100% tie-
in.  He testified he was tied-in with his lanyard as he climbed the tree and while he was 
cutting the limb, but he admitted that “where I started trimming at, I hadn’t been tied-in 
yet.”  Employee testified the foreman never gave him “the chance to really go up and tie-
in before rushing me.”  Employee admitted he learned from his two years of work with 
Employer that “I know to go in and tie-in,” and he said there were some limbs “in the 
way as I was going up before I can totally tie-in.”  When questioned by the trial judge 
about the “normal course of events,” Employee admitted it was normal to climb to the top 
using pole spikes and a lanyard and to tie off to the climbing rope once you get there 
before you start trimming.  However, Employee also testified it is proper to trim as you 
are ascending a tree.  Employer’s Safety Director, Rick Bentley, did not find fault with 
Employee trimming limbs as he ascended; rather, he testified Employee “has to be tied-in 
with a primary tie-in once he gets to where he’s at in the tree before he begins any work.” 
He explained the primary tie-in “is a climbing rope, not a safety strap.”  Bentley 
explained that “tied-in means that you are tied-in with a climbing rope or safety straps, 
and before any work is performed, you have to be -- it’s mandatory that you’re tied-in 
with a climbing line or a lifeline.”  
 
Bentley did not explain what the “100% tie-in” rule is, but he testified “we require 
our people to be tied-in from the time they leave the ground until the time they return 
back to the ground safely.”  When asked why Employer adopted safety guidelines, his 
response was that anytime you’re working aloft there is a possibility that somebody 
would cut their safety line, “so we address that properly by making it a mandatory 
requirement that people are tied-in 100 percent of the time, where nobody ever falls out 
of a tree.”  Bentley testified that Employee should have had a climbing line and “a safety 
strap in addition to the climbing line.”  He agreed that the safety strap is the same thing as 
the lanyard.  
 
While Employee asserted he was tied-in at all times with his lanyard, he admitted 
he was not “fully tied-in,” and he asserted his failure to do so was due to the foreman 
rushing him.  Although the testimony does not clearly define what the “100% tie-in” 
policy is, the trial judge found Employer had a 100% tie-in policy and that Employee had 
actual knowledge of the policy. Our role is not to ascertain the specifics of the policy or 
to determine the extent of Employee’s understanding of the policy; rather, we are to 
presume that the trial judge’s finding that Employee had actual, as opposed to 
constructive, notice of the rule and the trial judge’s conclusion in this regard are correct, 
unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-5-
239(c)(7).  We do not find the preponderance of the evidence to be otherwise than found 
by the trial judge. 
 
2.   Employee’s Understanding of the Danger Involved in Violating the Rule 
 
 Employee testified that he knows the rules and that “I always tie-in, because I 
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know -- you know, I’m scared of falling.  I’m not going to hurt myself.”  He testified that 
he had never had an accident before and that “I’m not suicidal.” The trial judge found 
that Employee’s own testimony evidenced a clear understanding of the danger involved 
in violating Employer’s tie-in policy.  The preponderance of the evidence supports that 
finding. 
 
3.   Employer’s Bona Fide Enforcement of the Rule 
 
 Employee offered very little testimony addressing whether Employer’s tie-in 
policies were enforced. When asked about Employer’s guidelines and how often, 
following the completion of his training, the guidelines were brought up by Employer, he 
responded, “not often.”  When asked whether he was aware that in the event he was not 
properly tied-in, he would be terminated, he stated he “was not aware of that.”  Employee 
was not asked whether Employer’s rules were routinely enforced.  There was, however, 
testimony from Employer’s Safety Director to the effect that the Employer’s rules were 
enforced and that Employer had terminated employees for violating lifesaving rules.  The 
Safety Director testified why Employer adopted the safety guidelines and the dangers of 
trimmers working aloft.  He stated, “so we address that properly by making it a 
mandatory requirement that people are tied-in 100 percent of the time . . . .”  He testified 
“in any situations we’ve had in the past where anybody violated a lifesaving rule, that 
employee is terminated.”  The trial judge found that the uncontroverted proof of 
Employer that the rule was strictly enforced on a regular basis established “bona fide” 
enforcement.  The evidence does not preponderate against this finding. 
 
4.  Employee’s Lack of a Valid Excuse for Violating the Rule 
  
Employee asserts that the foreman’s actions in rushing him to cut limbs as he 
ascended the tree provide a valid excuse for him not being fully tied-in.  Employee 
testified his foreman was “screaming at me, hollering at me to hurry up, so that’s what I 
was listening to . . . .”   He testified there were some limbs in his way going up the tree, 
“but the foreman was asking me to trim those limbs before I went all the way up.”  He 
testified “if [the foreman] wouldn’t have rushed me, I could have [done] things 
differently.” 
 
The record does not include any testimony or exhibits that support an assertion 
that the foreman specifically insisted that the tie-in rule or any other safety rule be 
violated.  In fact, as noted by the trial judge, the implication from the proof is that the 
foreman could not communicate such a direct instruction due to a language barrier.  From 
a review of the entire record, the only excuse asserted by Employee for failing to abide 
by the known rule and tie-in before he began cutting limbs would have to be based on the 
foreman’s communications with Employee as he ascended the tree.  Even if viewed in the 
light most favorable to Employee, the communications were limited to the foreman 
screaming “ándale, ándale, corte rápido.”  It is not clear from the record how many times 
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the foreman spoke or screamed these words or the order in which the foreman spoke the 
words, but it is uncontroverted that the foreman screamed or hollered these words as 
Employee ascended the tree.  Employee and his former co-worker testified that if you 
don’t listen to the foreman you could be disciplined by the company.  Whether Employee 
has a valid excuse for violating the known safety rule by not tying-in to his climbing rope 
before cutting must be analyzed by determining whether the words spoken by the 
foreman and the manner in which they were spoken provides a “plausible excuse” for 
Employee’s violation. Mitchell, 368 S.W.3d at 454. 
 
Employee’s Safety Director testified that “telling the employee to hurry up and get 
up there and cut the tree limb had nothing -- absolutely nothing to do with the safety on 
that particular job.” He explained that the employee still has to climb up the tree and 
follow the rules and tie-in and perform the work the correct way, “and that simply saying, 
‘hurry up and get up the tree and start working’ doesn’t constitute a safety issue to me.”  
When asked whether the Safety Director thought the foreman screaming at Employee had 
any bearing on the issue, the Safety Director testified as follows: 
 
I think if he was screaming at him, then [Employee] should have 
stopped and asked him why he was screaming at him or -- or questioned the 
situation.  Because all employees have the right to stop work.  That’s on our 
job briefings.  And that’s a stop-work authority, any time you’re 
uncomfortable with doing something somebody has asked you to do, every 
employee has the authority to stop work.  And if that was the case, then he 
should have stopped work and asked the foreman specifically what he 
wanted him to do and clarify it.  It still doesn’t justify not tying into the tree 
and working from it and putting your -- your life in jeopardy. 
 
Even if the foreman was screaming at Employee, the explanation that the foreman was 
rushing Employee simply does not qualify as a “plausible” explanation.  As stated by the 
trial judge, feeling rushed is simply not a plausible explanation for the noncompliance.  
The evidence does not preponderate against the trial judge’s finding that Employee 
lacked a valid excuse for not complying with the rule.  As in Mitchell, Employee’s lack 
of a valid excuse for tying-in before cutting, when the first three elements of Employer’s 
defense have been satisfied, amounts to willfulness.  See Mitchell, 368 S.W.3d at 455.    
The trial judge concluded that Employer successfully raised the willful misconduct 
defense and this conclusion is presumed to be correct as the evidence does not 
preponderate otherwise.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 

